Abstract.-To assess the employment e¤ects of labor costs it is crucial to have reliable estimates of the labor cost elasticity of labor demand. Using a matched …rm-worker dataset, we estimate a long run unconditional labor demand function, exploiting information on workers to correct for endogeneity in the determination of wages. We evaluate the employment and deadweight loss e¤ects of observed employers'contributions imposed by labor laws (health insurance, training, and taxes) as well as of observed workers'deductions (social security, and income tax). We …nd that non-wage labor costs reduce employment by 17% for white-collars and by 53% for blue-collars, with associated deadweight losses of 10% and 35% of total contributions, respectively. Since most …rms undercomply with mandated employers'and workers contributions, we …nd that full compliance would imply employment losses of 4% for white-collars and 12% for blue-collars, with respective associated deadweight losses of 2% and 6%.
Introduction
Non-wage labor costs consist of several mandated bene…ts, health, training, accident, housing plans, as well as several taxes, and are intended to increase workers'welfare and job security. However, these bene…ts tend to come at the expense of reducing employment and deadweight losses. In order to quantify these resulting e¤ects one needs a reliable measure of the employment-labor cost elasticity. Most studies conducted on this subject …nd low estimated values for this elasticity, which contrasts with policy-makers'enthusiasm to reduce labor costs.
In this article, using a Peruvian matched …rm-workers dataset, we …nd that nonwage labor costs reduce employment measured in total hours of work by 17% for white-collars and by 53% for blue-collars with associated deadweight losses of 10% and 35% of total contributions'revenues, respectively. We also compute employment losses of compliance with mandated employers'and workers contributions of 4% for white-collars and 12% for blue-collars, with respective associated deadweight losses of 2% and 6% of contribution revenues.
These results come from estimating the long run unconditional …rm-level labor demand function by a procedure that corrects for endogeneity of wages. We show that unbiased estimates, even using small units such as …rm level data, require not only that wages are exogenous, but also that their unobserved determinants are uncorrelated with the unobserved determinants of labor demand. This requirement is not ful…lled in the likely event, pointed by Becker (1993) , that larger …rms are matched with more productive workers. Consequently, an estimation that corrects for endogeneity yields a larger labor cost elasticity of labor demand than one that does not, like OLS.
In the last two decades, there has been intensive theoretical and empirical research on the e¤ects of labor market frictions on job creation. Western European economies, characterized by large job security provisions, have been the center of attention of this research that has modeled these frictions as adjustment costs in labor demand (Nickell 1987 , Hamermesh 1989 , Bentolila and Bertola 1990 , Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993 , Rendon 2000 .? This literature …nds that the e¤ects of 'eurosclerosis,'that is, labor markets with high …ring costs, are ambiguous: in good times, sclerotic labor markets create fewer jobs than free labor markets; however, in bad times, sclerotic labor markets reduce job destruction. Most of the research done in Latin America has been done under these guidelines, obtaining statistically signi…cant negative e¤ects of job security provisions on employment rates.
1 Furthermore, using country-level data for Latin America and OECD countries Heckman and Pagés-Serra (2000) found large e¤ects of job security provisions on employment, 2 which are robust to several speci…cations, OLS, random and …xed e¤ects. The authors present their results as a strong evidence against Freeman's (2000) view that job security regulations mostly a¤ect distribution, but not e¢ ciency, and "advocate the substitution of job security provisions by other mechanisms that provide income security at lower e¢ ciency and inequality costs." Under a classic labor demand framework and using workers-and …rm-level data, this article provides new evidence in the same direction, extending the computation of the e¤ects of job security provisions to deadweight losses. Hamermesh (1993) surveys several studies on the estimation of labor demand and remarks that estimates of the labor-cost employment elasticity should be interpreted and compared cautiously depending on the speci…cation adopted: whether capital is included as an explanatory variable in the estimation (if so one is estimating a short run labor demand; if not, it is a long run labor demand); whether output is included in the estimation (if it is, one is estimating a conditional labor demand; if not, an unconditional labor demand); whether one is estimating a system of equation
and thus controlling for endogeneity of wages (in which case one will typically …nd larger estimates). In our study we assume homogeneous labor and make two separate estimations for white-and blue-collar workers without allowing for interactions between them. Since our study is done for small units, at the …rm level, it is a reasonable assumption that …rms face a horizontal labor supply. However, assortative matching between …rms and workers gives rise to correlation between wages and …rm size, which calls for a correction of this endogeneity. Capital is not included in the estimation, nor output, which makes the estimation a long run, non-conditional labor demand estimation, that is, the scale e¤ect is included in the total e¤ect captured by our estimated elasticity. These features of our research explain why we …nd larger labor costs elasticities of employment 3 than estimates usually found for the standard speci…cation of a conditional labor demand. 4 Our results are thus encouraging of policies for stimulating job creation by inducing movements along as well as shifts of the labor demand curve.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section details our estimation approach which addresses the issue of endogeneity correction; Section 3 describes the dataset used, as well as descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses the resulting estimated labor-cost employment elasticities obtained by OLS and by an IV estimation, both for legal and for observed non-wage labor costs. In Section 5
we compute the employment reduction caused by workers'and employers'contributions. Section 6 reports the calculated deadweight losses of workers'and employers'
contributions as a proportion of contribution revenues. Section 7 reports the employment and deadweight losses of complying fully with legal workers' and employers'
contributions. Finally, Section 8 summarizes the article's main conclusions.
Estimation approach
Consider a static setup where a …rm i 2 f1; 2; :::; N g chooses inputs to maximize
The resulting demand for labor is given by the function L i (w a i j X i ), where w a i is the total labor cost paid by the …rm and X i = fp i ; r i ; i g represents output and input prices and the parameters of the production function for the …rm. A log-linear approximation to this function is
where X i are those variables contained in X i that are observed by the researcher, whereas u i is a random variable representing the unobserved components of X i , assumed to be normal with zero mean and variance 2 u . If wages are fully exogenous, that is, if ln w a i is uncorrelated with u i , then one can obtain an unbiased and consistent estimation of by OLS. For this assumption to hold, wages have to be determined by an in…nitely elastic labor supply. Actually, most empirical research, assumes exogenous wages and estimates the elasticity laborlabor cost by OLS. This includes those estimations that account for individual (…xed) e¤ects when panel data are available.
To illustrate this assertion, let the in…nitely elastic labor supply of individual j 2 f1; 2; :::; M i g related to …rm i be
where w d ij is the take-home wage, Z ij is a vector of covariates that determine wages, are its associated parameters, and v ij is a random variable of unobservables with zero mean, variance 2 v and covariance with u i equal to uv . This is a reduced form equation that can be though of as a Mincer equation in which Z ij only include supply-side variables, such as education, 5 tenure, experience, and individual workers'attributes.
6
Then …rm i faces a labor supply function:
where ln w
with mean 0, variance M 1 i 2 v , and covariance with u i equal to uv . Assume for the moment that wages paid by employers coincide with workers'take-home wages:
, then, as this is a recursive or limited information estimation model, OLS estimates yield unbiased estimates of the labor demand parameters. The crucial assumption for this to be true is that the …rm's individual labor supply is in…nitely elastic and error terms are independent, uv = 0.
However, it may well be the case that uv 6 = 0, which implies that ln w a i and u i are correlated and the estimation by OLS generates biased estimates. Moreover, if uv > 0, that is, if unobservables that increase wages are positively correlated with unobservables that increase labor demand, then estimated by OLS will exhibit an upward bias. One can think of this positive correlation as evidence for positive assortative matching between …rms and workers: more productive workers are matched to larger …rms. Or, in terms of the variables that are unobserved to the researcher, workers'of higher ability may work in …rms of higher total factor productivity. On the contrary, uv < 0 is associated with unobservables that increase wages negatively correlated with unobservables that increase labor demand, in which case OLS leads to underestimate . Therefore, that is the case of negative assortative matching between …rms and workers: more productive workers are matched to smaller …rms. 5 Unfortunately, our dataset does not include any variable that could possible proxy workers' education.
6 If Z ij Eq. (2) includes labor demand variables that are excluded in Eq. (1), then it becomes a typical reduced form and one can attempt to identify not only the labor demand labor cost elasticity, but also the labor supply labor cost elasticity. We leave this extension for future research.
7 Or, when employment is measured by individual hours of work, it is likely to …nd negative matching: more productive workers are matched to …rms with fewer individual hours of work, as shown in Section 4.
[ Figure 1 here] Figure 1 depicts the supply and demand for labor and illustrates this matching e¤ect: if D 1 is matched to S 1 , D 2 to S 2 , and D 3 to S 3 , then the resulting equilibrium points describe a positive relationship or a negative relationship that is steeper than the labor demand (overestimation of ); if matching between supply and demand is the other way round, negative, the relationship resulting from the equilibrium points is ‡atter than the labor demand (underestimation of ). Now, let us allow labor costs paid for by employers di¤er from workers'take-home wages. Suppose that employers'contributions expressed as a percentage of wages are a i , so that employers' labor costs are w a i = w i (1 + a i ). On the other hand, let d i be workers'contributions as a percentage of wages, and workers'take home wage is
Under the assumption that both employer-and worker-paid contributions are unrelated to unobservables that determine …rm's size 8 one can relate employers'labor costs to workers'earnings simply by
Notice that if wages are fully exogenous, 9 under no circumstance workers earn below ln w d i , which implies that workers'contributions are actually paid for by employers. In particular, if workers' contributions were reduced, employer-paid wages would adjust so that workers'take-home wages are left unchanged. This feature of the labor market will be important when analyzing the employment e¤ects of removing workers'and employers'contributions.
Under this setup we can propose the following estimation procedure: 8 In this article, we take undercompliance as given and only analyze its e¤ects on employment and measurement of the labor-cost elasticity; however, strictly speaking undercomplying is also a decision made by employers, which therefore would require a speci…c theoretical and empirical analysis.
9 This is an important identi…cation assumption, the labor supply is horizontal to the market, which makes feasible the determination of the labor cost elasticity of the labor demand. This assumption does not hold if the labor supply is horizontal to the …rm, but not to the market, as aggregation does not preserve the horizontal labor supply. This estimation procedure removes the correlation between labor costs paid for by employers and the disturbance term in Eq.
(1) and yields unbiased estimates of and .
To implement this estimation we need …rm-level data matched with data on individuals working at the …rm. In the next section, we describe the data used in the estimation.
Data
The data used in this estimation come from the Wage and Salary National Survey (ENSYS) carried out by the Ministry of Labor of Peru. This is a biquarterly survey applied in June and December, which comprises private …rms of 10 and more workers and is representative for the main cities (Metropolitan Lima and urban areas of 24 main cities in the country), economic sectors and activities, and …rms sizes in Peru.
The information for this survey is gathered by quali…ed interviewers from the Labor
Ministry who review …rms'payrolls and are specialized in labor costs in Peru; thus, this survey does not consist of self-reported data.
The survey is organized in three sections. Section A aggregate …rm-level information such as the total number of workers, wages by occupational category, total hours worked, legal workers'deductions and employers'contributions by occupational category. Section B contains information on a sample of individual workers inside the …rm, with variables such as age and gender of the worker, hours worked, basic wage or salary, legal workers'deductions and employers'contributions, and other nonpermanent payments. Finally, Section C provides information on collective bargaining and unionization of workers.
We use the survey for June 2004, which consists of a sample of 1,772 …rms, for which we have 19,770 workers. Because we concentrate on the demand for white-and blue-collar workers, we select two subsamples of …rms that hire at least one of these two types of workers. Thus, the resulting samples contain respectively 1,714 …rms with 13,097 white-collar workers, and 692 …rms with 5,413 blue-collar workers.
[ Table 1 here] Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables in the …nal sample, divided by type of worker and by section of the survey. For several variables there are both …rm-level as well as individual information. Understandably, there is more dispersion for information in the workers'sample (Section B). Both white-and blue-collar workers work on average more than 40 hours a week. On average, blue-collar workers work in …rms that are 30% larger than white-collars and earn half as much as white-collars.
[ Figure 2 here]
In this study, gross wages are de…ned as payments made by employers to their employees for their work that end up in employees'paychecks, including any mandatory bene…ts, 11 before deductions for income taxes and pension contributions are applied.
Workers'contributions are mandatory payments deducted from workers'paychecks, that is, pension contributions and income taxes. Employers' contribution are payments associated with workers' wages that employers pay and workers do not take home nor are deducted from workers'gross wages, but go to several funds, such as health or training systems, and payroll taxes.
12
We distinguish between observed and legal contributions: the former comes from the information in our sample, while the latter is calculated from the current labor laws in the country. We will speak of undercompliance when observed fall below legal contributions and of overcompliance if it is the other way round. 13 Both observed employers'and workers'contributions are on average lower than legal ones, i.e., undercompliance is predominant. 14 Observed employers'contribution are between 10%
and 11% of wages for all samples, while legal contributions are established at 14.5%.
For white-collars observed workers'contributions are between 15% and 16% of wages, while the legal contributions are around 18%; for blue-collars observed workers'contributions are around 12% of wages, while legal contributions are set at around 13%. Figure 2 shows the employers' contributions and workers' deductions as a function of wages, both for white-and blue-collar workers. For employers'contributions one can distinguish a dispersion around horizontal lines, because legal contributions are a …xed percentage that does not depend on wage levels. However, the dispersion of workers' deductions occurs around both increasing curves and horizontal lines, as some deductions are increasing in wages, income taxes, while others are …xed, pensions'contributions. Moreover, there is compliance with some contributions and not with others, which explains why one can distinguish several patterns in these graphs, which are illustrative of the important di¤erences between legal and observed 12 Thus employers'and workers'contributions are non-wage labor costs. The former displace the demand and the latter the supply of labor. Unlike other studies which only focus on employers'nonwage labor costs, both types of non-wage labor costs matter in reducing employment. Interestingly, from an economic point of view, as said before, if the labor supply is fully elastic, all non-wage labor costs are paid for by employers.
13 Actually, labor laws in Peru allow employers for delays in paying workers and employers'contributions, and even payments in installments. Thus, the discrepancy between observed and legal contributions is only partially a matter of compliance. We follow the approach of most studies that just use the established legal percentages of contributions in the analysis of the e¤ects of non-wage labor costs on employment.
14 The interested reader will …nd a brief explanation of the labor reforms in Peru in the nineties in Appendix A1 and a detailed description of non-wage labor costs in Appendix A2. non-wage labor costs.
In the subsample of white-collars, around 70% of …rms and 77% individuals are occupied in the service sector; whereas in the subsample of blue-collars around 50% of …rms and 57% of individuals are classi…ed as part of the industrial sector. For both subsamples most …rms are small, more than 50% employ 50 workers or less; however, more than 50% of workers work in …rms with 100 or more workers. Around half of …rms are located in Lima City, the capital of the country. Unionization is higher for blue-collar workers with rates between 15% and 20% of workers, while for white-collars unionization rates are between 8% and 14%.
In terms of individual data we …nd that 38% are females among the white-collars while only 14% among the blue-collars. On average both white-and blue-collars are around 38 years old, however among blue-collars there is more age dispersion especially at the lower tail: around 12% of blue-collars, against only 4% of white collars, are 24 years old or younger. In the samples both white-and blue-collars have on average around 6 years of tenure; however, in tenure it is blue collars who also exhibit more dispersion, especially at the lower tails. While 23% of white-collars have around less than one year of tenure, 29% of blue-collars have tenure of less than one year.
In the next sections, we present the results of estimating a labor demand model both by simple OLS and controlling for the endogeneity of wages.
Estimation results
In this section, we present the elasticities estimated by the procedure described in Section 2. We estimate several versions of the model, the results of which are presented in Table 2 . For the total hours of work and for the number of workers, we report in the …rst column an OLS estimation using the average wage reported in the …rm-level information, in the second column an OLS estimation using an average wage constructed using the individual information, and in the third column an estimation that accounts for endogeneity, an OLS estimation using the average of a predicted wage. For individual hours, we report OLS and IV results in the …rst and second columns, respectively.
[ Table 2 Both for white-and blue-collars, when employment is …rms' employment measured by hours of work or by the number of workers, an estimation that accounts for endogeneity yields a larger labor cost elasticity of labor demand than one that is done by simple OLS, which suggests the existence of positive assortative matching between …rms and workers. When employment is measured by individual hours of work, correcting for endogeneity reduces the labor cost elasticity of labor demand, implying negative assortative matching of workers and …rms'individual hours of work. In sum, more productive workers are matched to …rms that are larger, in terms of total hours worked and number of employees, and in which working time is shorter.
It is also noteworthy that the labor cost elasticity of the …rm-level labor demand is larger for blue-collar than for white-collar workers: measured by total hours it is -0.65 for white-collars and -2.31 for blue-collars; measured by the number of workers it is -0.51 for white-collars and -2.31 for blue-collars. In contrast, the individual hours labor demand has an elasticity of -0.05 for white-collars and 0.00 for blue-collars.
For white-collar workers there is no big di¤erence in estimating by OLS the total labor cost elasticity with the reported or the constructed …rm average wage (ln w m and ln w). The sign, however, in both of these estimations is wrong and only becomes negative once endogeneity is corrected for. Using legal rather than observed nonlabor costs produces an underestimation of the labor cost elasticity of employment as measured by total hours of work or number of workers, although this underestimation is lower once a correction for endogeneity is introduced. For individual hours of work, using legal rather than observed labor costs leads to a slight overestimation of this elasticity, though both yield very low values.
For blue-collar workers, estimating the labor cost elasticity by OLS with the reported or the constructed …rm average wage (ln w m and ln w) yields substantially di¤erent results. Estimating the total labor cost elasticity correcting for endogeneity yields very high values for employment measured by total hours and number of workers. The labor cost employment elasticity measured by total hours is underestimated when legal instead of observed non-wage labor costs are used; however, it is slightly overestimated when employment is measured by the number of workers. The labor cost elasticity of employment measured by individual hours has the wrong sign, its value is very small and in many cases non-signi…cant. As with white-collars, using legal rather than observed labor costs implies a slight overestimation of the labor elasticity of demand.
In sum, estimations of the …rm-level labor demand that are corrected for endogeneity generate large labor costs employment elasticities, especially for blue-collar workers. The opposite is true for the corresponding individual labor demand estimations, where corrections for endogeneity lower labor cost employment elasticities, especially for blue-collars.
In the next section, we use these estimated elasticities to forecast the employment and deadweight loss e¤ects of non-wage labor costs.
Employment e¤ects of non-wage labor costs
In this section, we predict the percentage employment variation produced by removing non-wage labor costs fully, that is, the e¤ects of eliminating 1. employer-paid non-labor costs: d ln L = b ln (1 + a); 2. worker-paid non-labor costs:
3. both employer-and worker-paid non-labor costs:
[ Table 3 here]
We perform these exercises 15 using both observed and legal non-wage labor costs and their associated estimated elasticities computed in the previous section, for the three measures of employment by total hours, number of workers, and individual hours. The results are reported in Table 3 and show that the largest employment e¤ects are obtained from reducing workers'non-wage labor costs, especially for whitecollar workers. For white-collar workers removing employer-paid non-wage labor costs increases …rm-level total hours of work by around 6% and the number of workers by 5%, while removing workers' paid non-wage labor costs increases hours of work by 11% and the number of workers by 8%. The elimination of both non-wage labor costs increases total hours by 17% and the number of workers by 13%. Thus, employment e¤ects for white-collars are larger for total hours than for number of workers. For individual hours e¤ects are small but signi…cant and positive: around 1% increase.
For blue-collar workers, employment e¤ects are similar for total hours and for the number for workers and much larger than for white-collars: 24% for removing employers' contributions and 29% for removing workers' contributions, so that the employment e¤ect of removing both contributions is 53%. For blue-collar workers individual hours e¤ects are not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Using legal rather than observed non-wage labor costs introduces an important overestimation of the employment e¤ects for blue-collar workers, measured by total hours, number of workers, or individual hours. For white-collar workers the di¤erences between legal and observed employment e¤ects are less pronounced. There is also an overestimation of employment variations when using legal non-wage labor costs for total and individual hours, but an underestimation for the number of workers.
Hence, the employment losses provoked by both employers'and workers'contributions are shown to be substantial, especially for blue-collar workers. Estimations that do not correct for endogeneity would have found positive signi…cant employment increases for white-collars and negligible increases for blue-collars, concluding thereby that non-wage labor costs had very little e¤ect in stimulating employment, as it is the case in most of the literature on this subject. In the next section, we compute the deadweight losses associated with these employment e¤ects.
Deadweight losses of non-wage labor costs
In this section we compute the deadweight loss e¤ects of employers' and workers' contributions. We estimated the model d ln L i = ln w a i + A i , where A i = X i are the employment e¤ects of all other regressors; that is, the level of employment is L = Aw . We have two wage levels, w 1 and w 0 (w 1 > w 0 ), which imply employment levels L 1 = Aw 1 and L 0 = Aw 0 , respectively. Contribution revenues are then R = (w 1 w 0 ) L 1 > 0, and the deadweight loss area comes from integrating:
In Appendix 4. we give further details on this computation (See also Auerbach and Hines (2002) . One can also approximate the deadweight loss, as it is usually done, by a (Harberger) triangle: Figure 3 illustrates the deadweight loss area T and the contribution revenues R, when there are both employer's contributions, which shift the labor demand downward, and worker's contribution, which shift the labor supply upward Table 4 reports the estimated deadweight losses of eliminating workers'and employers'contributions, using di¤erent measures of employment, of contributions, and of deadweight losses, for white-collar and for blue-collar workers, respectively. As with employment e¤ects deadweight losses are larger for workers' than for employers' contributions for both occupational categories, and larger for blue-collar than for white-collar workers. For white-collars deadweight losses of observed employers' contributions are 5.6% of contribution revenues; of observed workers' contributions they are 3.2% of contribution revenues, when measured by total hours. For bluecollars deadweight losses of observed employers' contributions are 12.5% of contribution revenues; of observed workers' contributions they are 16.1% of contribution revenues, when measured by total hours. For blue-collar workers deadweight losses are practically identical when employment is measured by the number of workers.
For white-collar workers, deadweight losses are 2.5% of contribution revenues for employers'contributions and 4% for workers'contributions. For individual hours e¤ects are very small for white-collar workers and, as employment e¤ects, appear with the wrong sign for blue-collar workers.
[ Table 4 here]
For white-collar workers deadweight losses, both in terms of total hours and the number of workers, are somewhat larger when measured by observed rather than by legal non-wage labor costs. For blue-collar workers, they are substantially smaller for the observed non-wage labor costs both when using total hours and the number of workers.
Thus, there are not only substantial employment losses but also large deadweight losses of mandated employers' and workers' contributions, especially for blue-collar workers.
Employment and deadweight losses of complying with legal contributions
In this section we analyze the employment and deadweight loss e¤ects of adjusting observed non-wage labor costs to their legal level.
[ Table 5 here]
What is the employment e¤ect of …rms not fully complying with paying employers' and workers'contributions fully? Because of under-compliance, the actual labor cost incurred by …rms is lower than the stipulated legal one. Table 5 reports the e¤ects of not complying with legal contributions on employment measured by total hours worked at the …rm level, the number of workers by …rm, and individual hours. For white-collar workers the e¤ect of not complying with legal workers'contributions is about the same as the e¤ect of not complying with employers'contributions, 2.42%
for total hours, 1.90% for the number of workers, and 0.17% for individual hours.
The total e¤ect of not complying with these two contributions amounts to 4.83% for total hours, 3.81% for the number of workers, and 0.34% of individual hours.
For blue-collar worker the picture is somewhat di¤erent, as the employment e¤ect of not complying with the employers' contributions is larger than the e¤ect of not complying with the workers'contributions. Moreover, since the labor cost elasticity is large, the employment e¤ects are much larger than for white-collar workers. As one would expect because of the low labor costs individual hours elasticities,for blue-collar workers the e¤ect in individual hours is negligible. Both for employment measured as total hours of work or the number of workers, employment e¤ects of not complying with employers'contributions is around 7.5%, and it is around 4.1% for not complying with workers'contributions. Thus, the e¤ect of not complying with both contributions is around 11.6%. As shown in the previous sections, variations in the individual hours margin induced by labor costs variations is somewhat important only for white-collar workers, not for blue-collars.
[ Table 6 here]
In Table 6 we show the deadweight losses resulting from complying fully with the legal level of non-wage labor costs. 16 As in the previous section, we compute them both as an integral and simply as a triangle. For white collar workers, the deadweight loss of both employer's and worker's contributions measured as total hours or as the number of workers is around 2% of contribution revenues, split almost evenly between the two. For blue collar workers, the deadweight loss represents around 6% of contribution revenues, again for both contributions and measured as total hours or the number of workers. Once again, individual hours of blue collar workers are not reactive to labor costs variations; consequently deadweight losses are smaller than for white-collars.
In sum, judging from its implied employment and deadweight losses, undercompliance is substantial. Employment losses of compliance with mandated employers' and workers contributions are 4% for white-collars and 12% for blue-collars, with respective associated deadweight losses of 2% and 6% of contribution revenues.
Conclusions
Using a matched …rm-workers dataset we have shown that an estimation that accounts for endogeneity of wages yields a larger labor cost elasticity of a long run, unconditional labor demand than one obtained by OLS. We explain that this result is evidence for positive assortative matching between …rms and workers: larger …rms are matched with more productive workers. We …nd that employer's and worker's paid non-wage labor costs reduce employment by 17% for white-collars and by 53%
for blue-collars. The associated deadweight loss of these non-wage labor costs are 9% of contribution revenues for white-collar workers and 31% of contribution revenues for blue-collars. Signi…cant increases of individual hours only occur for white-collar, not for blue-collar workers, that is, white-collars exhibit a larger labor costs elasticity of demand for individual hours than blue-collars.
On the other hand, estimating labor costs employment elasticities using nonwage labor costs measured in the available datasets rather using legally established rules yields substantially di¤erent results only for white-collar workers, for which undercompliance with legal contributions is larger than for blue-collars. Furthermore, we compute the employment e¤ects of undercomplying with the mandated employers' and workers contributions. Because of undercompliance employment is 4% larger for white-collars and 12% larger for blue-collars. The deadweight loss of complying with mandated contribution is 2% for white-collars and 6% of contribution revenues for blue-collars.
These results show large employment and, often ignored, deadweight losses of both mandated employer's and worker's contributions and are thus encouraging of policies to increase job creation by lowering non-wage labor costs. Additional wages include payments that should cover for weekends (DSO, Descanso semanal obligatorio), non-working holidays (FNL, Feriados no laborables), and bonuses that are related to the number of family members (family assignments). Besides, workers receive two extra monthly wages every year as Christmas and National Holiday bonuses called Grati…caciones. Vacations are paid holidays that last 30 days per year worked for the same employer. The tenure bonus (CTS, Compensación por Tiempo de Servicios) is an additional wage payment for every tenure year of the worker. Health Plan Payments represent 9% of the basic wage, of which 6.75% is for the public system (ESSALUD, Seguro Social de Salud) and 2.25% goes to the private system (EPS, Empresas Prestadoras de Salud), if the worker has a private health insurance. Otherwise, the whole contribution goes to the public system.
The Solidarity Extraordinary Tax (IES, Impuesto Extraordinario de Solidaridad) was created in 1998 to replace mandatory contributions to …nance housing, National Housing Fund (FONAVI, Fondo Nacional de Vivienda). Initiallly, it amounted to 2% of the basic wage., but then went down to 1.7%.
Manufacturing Training contributions (SENATI, Servicio Nacional de Adiestramiento en Trabajo) only apply to some industrial …rms (Category D of SIC). From 1994 onwards they have been going down from 1.5% to become, in 1997, 0.75% of the basic wage. Accident Insurance (SCTR, Seguro Complementario de Trabajo de Riesgo) is on average 3% of the basic wage.
Workers'deductions consist of income taxes and social security contributions and vary depending on the wage level and on whether the pension system is private or public: Employers retain income taxes and mandatory social security contributions from workers'wages. For wage levels below 7 Tax Units (UIT, Unidad Impositiva Tributaria), there is no retention, Tax Units are monetary amounts …xed by the government, and updated from time to time. On June 2004, the UIT was S/. 3,200. From 7 UIT onwards employers have to make income tax deductions on workers'payments: the lowest rate is 15% while the highest reach 30%. The amount of social security contributions di¤ers depending on the type of system. In the public pension system the contribution is 13%. In the private pension system the mandatory …xed contribution rate is 8%, the maintenance fee is on average 2.27%, and the insurance fee is on average 0.92%, totalling to 11.19%.
A3. Wage regressions
In Table A1 we report the wage regressions, the …rst stage of our estimation of the labor demand elasticity. These are Mincer regressions done for white-and blue-collars, both for weekly and hourly wages, and for take-home wages using observed and legal workers deductions. Unfortunately, in the dataset we do not have workers'education, which would make our regression a typical Mincer regression. However, we have age (which proxies potential experience) and tenure, as well as gender, union status, city of residence (Lima vs. other), and industrial sector.
Both returns to age and to tenure are larger for white-collars than for blue-collars. However, while returns to age are larger than returns to tenure for white-collars, the opposite is true for blue-collars, returns to tenure are larger than returns to age. Among blue-collars gender wage di¤erences are more pronounced than among white-collars. For blue-collars male workers earn around 20% more than their female counterparts. Among white-collars males earn around 7% more in weekly wages, but 3% more in hourly wage, than female workers. This di¤erence may be due to the lower amount of hours worked by female white-collar workers. The e¤ect of being unionized is to increase wages by around 25% for white-collars and by around 21% for blue-collars. Working in Lima, the capital of Peru, means a di¤erential of more than 50% in white-collar wages and of 20% of blue-collar wages, over working in other cities. 
A4. Computation of deadweight losses
The computation of the deadweight areas proceeds in the following way:
Notice that for any value of , if < w 1 > w 0 , then 
